收集 CrowdStrike Falcon 記錄

本文說明如何將 CrowdStrike Falcon 記錄擷取至 Google Security Operations。您可以擷取多種 CrowdStrike Falcon 記錄,本文將說明每種記錄的具體設定。

如需 Google Security Operations 資料擷取作業的高階總覽,請參閱「將資料擷取至 Google Security Operations」。

支援的 CrowdStrike Falcon 記錄類型

Google Security Operations 支援下列 CrowdStrike Falcon 記錄類型,並透過剖析器搭配下列擷取標籤:

  • 端點偵測與應變 (EDR)CS_EDR。這個剖析器會剖析 CrowdStrike Falcon Data Replicator (FDR) 的近乎即時遙測資料,例如檔案存取和登錄修改。資料通常會從 S3 或 Cloud Storage bucket 擷取。
  • 偵測結果CS_DETECTS。這個剖析器會使用 Detect API,剖析 CrowdStrike 的偵測摘要事件。CS_DETECTS 與端點活動相關,但相較於使用 CS_EDR 剖析的原始遙測資料,CS_DETECTS 提供的是更高層級的偵測摘要。

  • 快訊CS_ALERTS。這個剖析器會使用 Alerts API 剖析 CrowdStrike 的快訊。CrowdStrike Alerts 剖析器支援下列產品類型:

    • epp
    • idp
    • overwatch
    • xdr
    • mobile
    • cwpp
    • ngsiem
  • 入侵指標 (IoC)CS_IOC. 這個剖析器會使用 CrowdStrike Chronicle Intel Bridge,從 CrowdStrike Threat Intelligence 剖析入侵指標 (IoC) 和攻擊指標 (IOA)。CrowdStrike 入侵指標 (IoC) 剖析器支援下列指標類型:

    • domain
    • email_address
    • file_name
    • file_path
    • hash_md5
    • hash_sha1
    • hash_sha256
    • ip_address
    • mutex_name
    • url

Google SecOps 建議使用 CS_EDRCS_DETECTSCS_IOC 的資訊提供,從 CrowdStrike 擷取完整資料。

事前準備

請確認您已完成下列事前準備事項:

  • CrowdStrike 執行個體的管理員權限,可安裝 CrowdStrike Falcon Host 感應器
  • 部署架構中的所有系統都以世界標準時間設定時區。
  • 目標裝置搭載支援的作業系統
    • 必須是 64 位元伺服器
    • CrowdStrike Falcon Host 感應器 6.51 以上版本支援 Microsoft Windows Server 2008 R2 SP1。
    • 舊版作業系統必須支援 SHA-2 程式碼簽署。
  • Google SecOps 服務帳戶檔案,以及 Google SecOps 支援團隊提供的客戶 ID

設定動態饋給

在 Google SecOps 平台中,有兩種不同的進入點可設定動態饋給:

  • 依序點選「SIEM Settings」>「Feeds」>「Add New Feed」
  • 依序點選「內容中心」「內容包」「開始使用」

如要進一步瞭解如何為這個產品系列中的不同記錄類型設定多個動態饋給,請參閱「依產品設定動態饋給」。

擷取 CrowdStrike Falcon 記錄

本節說明如何為不同類型的 CrowdStrike Falcon 記錄設定擷取作業。

擷取 EDR 記錄 (CS_EDR)

視要從 CrowdStrike 傳送記錄的位置而定,您可以使用下列其中一種方法擷取 CrowdStrike Falcon EDR 記錄:

  • Amazon SQS:使用 Falcon Data Replicator 動態饋給。
  • Amazon S3:使用為 S3 儲存桶設定的 Google Security Operations 資訊提供。
  • Google Cloud Storage:讓 CrowdStrike 將記錄檔推送至 Cloud Storage bucket。

請選擇下列其中一個程序。

方法 1:從 Amazon SQS 擷取 EDR 記錄

這個方法會使用 CrowdStrike Falcon Data Replicator 將 EDR 記錄傳送至 Amazon SQS 佇列,然後 Google Security Operations 會輪詢該佇列。

  1. 按一下「CrowdStrike」CrowdStrike套件。
  2. 在「CrowdStrike Falcon」記錄類型中,為下列欄位指定值:

    • 來源:Amazon SQS
    • 區域:與 URI 相關聯的 S3 區域。
    • 佇列名稱:要從中讀取記錄資料的 SQS 佇列名稱。
    • S3 URI:S3 bucket 來源 URI。
    • 帳號:SQS 帳號。
    • 佇列存取金鑰 ID:20 個字元的帳戶存取金鑰 ID。例如:AKIAOSFOODNN7EXAMPLE
    • 佇列存取密鑰:40 個字元的存取密鑰。例如:wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG/bPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEY
    • 來源刪除選項:可選擇在資料移轉後刪除檔案和目錄。

    進階選項

    • 動態饋給名稱:系統預先填入的值,用於識別動態饋給。
    • 資產命名空間與動態饋給相關聯的命名空間
    • 擷取標籤:套用至這個動態饋給所有事件的標籤。
  3. 按一下「建立動態饋給」

如要進一步瞭解如何為這個產品系列中的不同記錄類型設定多個動態饋給,請參閱「依產品設定動態饋給」。

方法 2:從 Amazon S3 值區擷取 EDR 記錄

這個方法需要設定 Google Security Operations 資訊提供,直接從 Amazon S3 值區提取 EDR 記錄。

如要使用 S3 bucket 設定擷取動態饋給,請按照下列步驟操作:

  1. 依序前往「SIEM 設定」>「動態饋給」
  2. 按一下「新增動態消息」
  3. 在下一個頁面中,按一下「設定單一動態饋給」
  4. 在「動態消息名稱」欄位中,輸入動態消息的名稱,例如「Crowdstrike Falcon Logs」
  5. 在「來源類型」中,選取「Amazon S3」
  6. 在「記錄類型」中,選取「CrowdStrike Falcon」
  7. 根據您建立的服務帳戶和 Amazon S3 值區設定,為下列欄位指定值:
    欄位 說明
    region S3 區域 URI。
    S3 uri S3 bucket 來源 URI。
    uri is a URI 指向的物件類型 (例如檔案或資料夾)。
    source deletion option 可選擇在資料轉移後刪除檔案和目錄。
    access key id 存取金鑰 (20 個字元的英數字串)。例如 AKIAOSFOODNN7EXAMPLE
    secret access key 存取密鑰 (40 個字元的英數字串)。例如 wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG/bPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEY
    oauth client id 公開 OAuth 用戶端 ID。
    oauth client secret OAuth 2.0 用戶端密鑰。
    oauth secret refresh uri OAuth 2.0 用戶端密鑰更新 URI。
    asset namespace 與動態饋給相關聯的命名空間。
  8. 依序點選「下一步」和「提交」

選項 3:從 Cloud Storage 擷取 EDR 記錄

您可以將 CrowdStrike 設為將 EDR 記錄傳送至 Cloud Storage bucket,然後使用資訊提供將這些記錄擷取至 Google Security Operations。這項程序需要與 CrowdStrike 支援團隊協調。

  1. 聯絡 CrowdStrike 支援團隊:向 CrowdStrike 建立支援票證,啟用並設定將 EDR 記錄檔推送至 Cloud Storage bucket。並提供必要設定的指引。

  2. 建立 Cloud Storage bucket 並授予權限:

    1. 在 Google Cloud 控制台中,建立新的 Cloud Storage bucket。請記下 bucket 名稱 (例如 gs://my-crowdstrike-edr-logs/)。
    2. 將寫入權限授予 CrowdStrike 提供的服務帳戶。按照 CrowdStrike 支援團隊的指示操作。
  3. 設定 Google SecOps 動態饋給:

    1. 在 Google SecOps 執行個體中,依序前往「設定」>「動態饋給」,然後按一下「新增」
    2. 輸入描述性動態饋給名稱 (例如 CS-EDR-GCS)。
    3. 在「來源類型」部分,選取「Google Cloud Storage V2」
    4. 在「記錄類型」部分,選取「CrowdStrike Falcon」。
    5. 在服務帳戶部分,按一下「取得服務帳戶」,複製顯示的專屬服務帳戶電子郵件地址。
    6. 在 Google Cloud 控制台中,前往 Cloud Storage 值區,然後將 Storage Object Viewer IAM 角色授予您複製的服務帳戶電子郵件地址。這樣動態消息就能讀取記錄檔。
    7. 返回 Google SecOps 資訊動態設定頁面。
    8. 輸入「儲存空間值區網址」 (例如 gs://my-crowdstrike-edr-logs/)。這個網址必須以尾端正斜線 (/) 結尾。
    9. 選取「來源刪除選項」。建議選取「一律不刪除檔案」
    10. 點選「下一步」,檢查設定,然後點選「提交」
  4. 確認記錄擷取作業:CrowdStrike 確認記錄已推送後,請在 Google SecOps 中檢查是否有 Log Type CROWDSTRIKE_EDR 的傳入記錄。

擷取快訊記錄 (CS_ALERTS)

如要擷取 CrowdStrike Falcon 快訊,請設定使用 CrowdStrike API 的動態饋給。

  1. 在 CrowdStrike Falcon 控制台中:

    1. 登入 CrowdStrike Falcon Console。
    2. 依序前往「支援與資源」 >「資源與工具」 >「API 用戶端和金鑰」,然後按一下「建立 API 用戶端」
    3. 輸入「用戶端名稱」和「說明」
    4. 在「API Scopes」(API 範圍) 中,選取「Alerts」(快訊) 的「Read」(讀取) 和「Write」(寫入) 方塊。
    5. 點按「Create」(建立)。記下產生的「Client ID」(用戶端 ID)、「Client Secret」(用戶端密鑰) 和「Base URL」(基本網址)
  2. 在 Google Security Operations 中:

    1. 依序前往「設定」>「動態消息」,然後按一下「新增」
    2. 在「來源類型」中選取「第三方 API」
    3. 在「記錄類型」中選取「CrowdStrike Alerts API」
    4. 按一下「下一步」,然後使用 CrowdStrike API 用戶端的值填寫下列欄位:
      • OAuth 權杖端點
      • OAuth 用戶端 ID
      • OAuth 用戶端密鑰
      • 基準網址
    5. 依序點選「下一步」和「提交」

擷取偵測記錄 (CS_DETECTS)

如要擷取 CrowdStrike Falcon 偵測記錄,您也需要使用 CrowdStrike API。

  1. 在 CrowdStrike Falcon 控制台中:

    1. 登入 CrowdStrike Falcon Console。
    2. 依序前往「支援應用程式」 >「API 用戶端和金鑰」
    3. 建立新的 API 用戶端金鑰組。這個金鑰組必須具備 DetectionsREAD 權限。
  2. 在 Google Security Operations 中:

    1. 依序前往「設定」>「動態消息」,然後按一下「新增」
    2. 在「來源類型」中選取「第三方 API」
    3. 在「記錄類型」中選取「CrowdStrike Detection Monitoring」
    4. 依序點選「下一步」和「提交」。系統會提示您輸入建立的 API 憑證。

擷取 IoC 記錄 (CS_IOC)

如要從 CrowdStrike 擷取入侵指標 (IoC) 記錄,請使用 Google SecOps Intel Bridge。

  1. 在 CrowdStrike Falcon 控制台中,建立新的 API 用戶端金鑰組。這個金鑰組必須具有 Indicators (Falcon Intelligence)READ 權限。
  2. 按照「CrowdStrike to Google SecOps Intel Bridge」一文中的操作說明,設定 Google SecOps Intel Bridge。
  3. 執行下列 Docker 指令,將 CrowdStrike 的記錄傳送至 Google SecOps。sa.json 是您的 Google SecOps 服務帳戶檔案。

    docker build . -t ccib:latest
    docker run -it --rm \
          -e FALCON_CLIENT_ID="$FALCON_CLIENT_ID"  \
          -e FALCON_CLIENT_SECRET="$FALCON_CLIENT_SECRET"  \
          -e FALCON_CLOUD_REGION="$FALCON_CLOUD"  \
          -e CHRONICLE_CUSTOMER_ID="$CHRONICLE_CUSTOMER_ID"  \
          -e GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS=/ccib/sa.json  \
          -v  ~/my/path/to/service/account/filer/sa.json:/ccib/sa.json  \
          ccib:latest
    
  4. 容器執行後,IoC 記錄就會開始串流至 Google SecOps。

如果這些設定有任何問題,請與 Google SecOps 支援團隊聯絡。

CrowdStrike 快訊記錄的 UDM 對應差異。

UDM 對應差異參考資料:CS_ALERTS

下表列出 CS ALERTS 的預設剖析器與進階版 CS ALERTS 之間的差異。

Default UDM Mapping Log Field Premium Mapping Delta
about.resource.product_object_id cid Removed mapping to avoid duplication, as the cid log field is also mapped to metadata.product_deployment_id.
principal.asset.platform_software.platform platform If the device.platform_name log field value is empty and the platform log field value is not empty and if the platform log field value matches the regular expression pattern (?i)Windows then, the principal.asset.platform_software.platform UDM field is set to WINDOWS. Else, if platform log field value matches the regular expression pattern (?i)Linux then, the principal.asset.platform_software.platform UDM field is set to LINUX. Else, if platform log field value matches the regular expression pattern (?i)Mac then, the principal.asset.platform_software.platform UDM field is set to MAC. Else, if platform log field value matches the regular expression pattern (?i)ios then, the principal.asset.platform_software.platform UDM field is set to IOS.
security_result.detection_fields[agent_id] agent_id If the device.device_id log field value is empty and the host_id log field value is empty and the mdm_device_id log field value is empty then, CS:%{agent_id} log field is mapped to the principal.asset_id UDM field.
Else, the principal.asset.attribute.labels.key UDM field is set to agent_id and agent_id log field is mapped to the principal.asset.attribute.labels.value UDM field.
security_result.detection_fields[idp_policy_account_event_type] idp_policy_account_event_type security_result.rule_labels[idp_policy_account_event_type]
security_result.detection_fields[idp_policy_mfa_factor_type] idp_policy_mfa_factor_type security_result.rule_labels[idp_policy_mfa_factor_type]
security_result.detection_fields[idp_policy_mfa_provider_name] idp_policy_mfa_provider_name security_result.rule_labels[idp_policy_mfa_provider_name]
security_result.detection_fields[idp_policy_mfa_provider] idp_policy_mfa_provider security_result.rule_labels[idp_policy_mfa_provider]
security_result.detection_fields[idp_policy_rule_action] idp_policy_rule_action security_result.rule_labels[idp_policy_rule_action]
security_result.detection_fields[idp_policy_rule_trigger] idp_policy_rule_trigger security_result.rule_labels[idp_policy_rule_trigger]
security_result.detection_fields[idp_policy_rule_id] idp_policy_rule_id security_result.rule_id
security_result.detection_fields[idp_policy_rule_name] idp_policy_rule_name security_result.rule_name
security_result.detection_fields[status] status If the status log field value matches the regular expression pattern (?i)new then, status log field is mapped to the security_result.about.investigation.status UDM field with the value NEW.
Else, if status log field value matches the regular expression pattern (?i)closed then, status log field is mapped to the security_result.about.investigation.status UDM field with the value CLOSED.
Else, status log field is mapped to the security_result.detection_fields[status] UDM field.
target.process.file.mime_type alleged_filetype If the technique_name log field value contain one of the following values
  • Archive via Library
  • Ingress Tool Transfer
  • Remote File Copy
  • File Transfer Protocols
  • Credentials from Web Browsers
  • Credentials In Files
  • Proc Filesystem
  • Unsecured Credentials
  • File Deletion
  • Obfuscated Files or Information
  • Compile After Delivery
  • Compiled HTML File
  • Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
  • Double File Extension
  • File and Directory Permissions Modification
  • File System Logical Offsets
  • Hidden Files and Directories
  • Install Root Certificate
  • Archive Collected Data
  • Archive via Custom Method
  • Archive via Utility
  • Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification
  • MMC
  • NTFS File Attributes
  • PubPrn
  • Resource Forking
  • Rundll32
  • Scripting
  • Space after Filename
  • System Script Proxy Execution
  • XSL Script Processing
  • Intelligence Indicator - Hash
  • Known Hash
  • Malicious File
  • File and Directory Discovery
  • AppleScript
  • Command and Scripting Interpreter
  • JavaScript
  • JavaScript/JScript
  • Malicious Image
  • PowerShell
  • Python
  • Service Execution
  • Unix Shell
  • User Execution
  • Data Destruction
  • Spearphishing Attachment
  • .bash_profile and .bashrc
  • Change Default File Association
  • Ccache Files
  • Chat Messages
  • Multi-Factor Authentication
  • TCC Manipulation
  • Application Versioning
  • Fileless Storage
  • Embedded Payloads
  • File/Path Exclusions
  • Encrypted/Encoded File
  • Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
  • Masquerade File Type
  • Stripped Payloads
  • Clear Network Connection History and Configurations
  • Disable or Modify Linux Audit System
  • Junk Code Insertion
  • Extended Attributes
  • SVG Smuggling
  • Indicator Removal
  • LNK Icon Smuggling
  • Polymorphic Code
  • Relocate Malware
  • Clear Persistence
  • Compression
  • Compromise Host Software Binary
  • Conceal Multimedia Files
  • Browser Information Discovery
  • Taint Shared Content
  • Shared Webroot
then, alleged_filetype log field is mapped to the target.file.mime_type UDM field.
Else, alleged_filetype log field is mapped to the target.process.file.mime_type UDM field.
principal.resource.product_object_id device.cid principal.asset.attribute.labels[device_cid]
security_result.detection_fields[active_directory_dn_display] device.hostinfo.active_directory_dn_display Iterate through log field device.hostinfo.active_directory_dn_display, then
the security_result.detection_fields.key UDM field is set to device_hostinfo_active_directory_dn_display and device.hostinfo.active_directory_dn_display log field is mapped to the security_result.detection_fields.value UDM field.
principal.asset.platform_software.platform device.platform_name If the device.platform_name log field value is not empty and if the device.platform_name log field value matches the regular expression pattern (?i)Windows then, the principal.asset.platform_software.platform UDM field is set to WINDOWS. Else, if device.platform_name log field value matches the regular expression pattern (?i)Linux then, the principal.asset.platform_software.platform UDM field is set to LINUX. Else, if device.platform_name log field value matches the regular expression pattern (?i)Mac then, the principal.asset.platform_software.platform UDM field is set to MAC. Else, if device.platform_name log field value matches the regular expression pattern (?i)ios then, the principal.asset.platform_software.platform UDM field is set to IOS. if the platform log field value is not empty and the device.platform_name log field value is equal to the platform log field value then, the principal.asset.attribute.labels.key UDM field is set to platform and platform log field is mapped to the principal.asset.attribute.labels.value UDM field.
principal.asset.platform_software.platform_version device.system_product_name principal.asset.hardware.model
target.process.file.names filename If the technique_name log field value contain one of the following values
  • Archive via Library
  • Ingress Tool Transfer
  • Remote File Copy
  • File Transfer Protocols
  • Credentials from Web Browsers
  • Credentials In Files
  • Proc Filesystem
  • Unsecured Credentials
  • File Deletion
  • Obfuscated Files or Information
  • Compile After Delivery
  • Compiled HTML File
  • Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
  • Double File Extension
  • File and Directory Permissions Modification
  • File System Logical Offsets
  • Hidden Files and Directories
  • Install Root Certificate
  • Archive Collected Data
  • Archive via Custom Method
  • Archive via Utility
  • Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification
  • MMC
  • NTFS File Attributes
  • PubPrn
  • Resource Forking
  • Rundll32
  • Scripting
  • Space after Filename
  • System Script Proxy Execution
  • XSL Script Processing
  • Intelligence Indicator - Hash
  • Known Hash
  • Malicious File
  • File and Directory Discovery
  • AppleScript
  • Command and Scripting Interpreter
  • JavaScript
  • JavaScript/JScript
  • Malicious Image
  • PowerShell
  • Python
  • Service Execution
  • Unix Shell
  • User Execution
  • Data Destruction
  • Spearphishing Attachment
  • .bash_profile and .bashrc
  • Change Default File Association
  • Ccache Files
  • Chat Messages
  • Multi-Factor Authentication
  • TCC Manipulation
  • Application Versioning
  • Fileless Storage
  • Embedded Payloads
  • File/Path Exclusions
  • Encrypted/Encoded File
  • Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
  • Masquerade File Type
  • Stripped Payloads
  • Clear Network Connection History and Configurations
  • Disable or Modify Linux Audit System
  • Junk Code Insertion
  • Extended Attributes
  • SVG Smuggling
  • Indicator Removal
  • LNK Icon Smuggling
  • Polymorphic Code
  • Relocate Malware
  • Clear Persistence
  • Compression
  • Compromise Host Software Binary
  • Conceal Multimedia Files
  • Browser Information Discovery
  • Taint Shared Content
  • Shared Webroot
then, filename log field is mapped to the target.file.names UDM field.
Else, filename log field is mapped to the target.process.file.names UDM field.
target.file.full_path filepath If the technique_name log field value contain one of the following values
  • Archive via Library
  • Ingress Tool Transfer
  • Remote File Copy
  • File Transfer Protocols
  • Credentials from Web Browsers
  • Credentials In Files
  • Proc Filesystem
  • Unsecured Credentials
  • File Deletion
  • Obfuscated Files or Information
  • Compile After Delivery
  • Compiled HTML File
  • Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
  • Double File Extension
  • File and Directory Permissions Modification
  • File System Logical Offsets
  • Hidden Files and Directories
  • Install Root Certificate
  • Archive Collected Data
  • Archive via Custom Method
  • Archive via Utility
  • Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification
  • MMC
  • NTFS File Attributes
  • PubPrn
  • Resource Forking
  • Rundll32
  • Scripting
  • Space after Filename
  • System Script Proxy Execution
  • XSL Script Processing
  • Intelligence Indicator - Hash
  • Known Hash
  • Malicious File
  • File and Directory Discovery
  • AppleScript
  • Command and Scripting Interpreter
  • JavaScript
  • JavaScript/JScript
  • Malicious Image
  • PowerShell
  • Python
  • Service Execution
  • Unix Shell
  • User Execution
  • Data Destruction
  • Spearphishing Attachment
  • .bash_profile and .bashrc
  • Change Default File Association
  • Ccache Files
  • Chat Messages
  • Multi-Factor Authentication
  • TCC Manipulation
  • Application Versioning
  • Fileless Storage
  • Embedded Payloads
  • File/Path Exclusions
  • Encrypted/Encoded File
  • Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
  • Masquerade File Type
  • Stripped Payloads
  • Clear Network Connection History and Configurations
  • Disable or Modify Linux Audit System
  • Junk Code Insertion
  • Extended Attributes
  • SVG Smuggling
  • Indicator Removal
  • LNK Icon Smuggling
  • Polymorphic Code
  • Relocate Malware
  • Clear Persistence
  • Compression
  • Compromise Host Software Binary
  • Conceal Multimedia Files
  • Browser Information Discovery
  • Taint Shared Content
  • Shared Webroot
then, filepath log field is mapped to the target.file.full_path UDM field.
Else, filepath log field is mapped to the target.process.file.full_path UDM field.
If the product log field value is equal to epp and the type log field value is equal to ofp and if the macros.ioc_description log field value is not empty then, macros.ioc_description log field is mapped to the target.file.full_path UDM field and the security_result.detection_fields.key UDM field is set to filepath and filepath log field is mapped to the security_result.detection_fields.value UDM field.
target.process_ancestors.command_line grandparent_details.cmdline target.process.parent_process.parent_process.command_line
target.process_ancestors.file.names grandparent_details.filename target.process.parent_process.parent_process.file.names
target.process_ancestors.file.full_path grandparent_details.filepath target.process.parent_process.parent_process.file.full_path
target.process_ancestors.file.md5 grandparent_details.md5 target.process.parent_process.parent_process.file.md5
target.process_ancestors.product_specific_process_id grandparent_details.process_graph_id If the grandparent_details.process_graph_id log field value is not empty then, PRODUCT_SPECIFIC_PROCESS_ID: %{grandparent_details.process_graph_id} log field is mapped to the target.process.parent_process.parent_process.product_specific_process_id UDM field.
target.process_ancestors.pid grandparent_details.process_id target.process.parent_process.parent_process.pid
target.process_ancestors.file.sha256 grandparent_details.sha256 target.process.parent_process.parent_process.file.sha256
security_result.detection_fields[ioc_description] ioc_context.ioc_description Iterate through log field ioc_context, then
the security_result.detection_fields.key UDM field is set to ioc_context_ioc_description and ioc_context.ioc_description log field is mapped to the security_result.detection_fields.value UDM field.
security_result.detection_fields[ioc_source] ioc_context.ioc_source Iterate through log field ioc_context, then
the security_result.detection_fields.key UDM field is set to ioc_context_ioc_source and ioc_context.ioc_source log field is mapped to the security_result.detection_fields.value UDM field.
target.process.file.md5 md5 If the technique_name log field value contain one of the following values
  • Archive via Library
  • Ingress Tool Transfer
  • Remote File Copy
  • File Transfer Protocols
  • Credentials from Web Browsers
  • Credentials In Files
  • Proc Filesystem
  • Unsecured Credentials
  • File Deletion
  • Obfuscated Files or Information
  • Compile After Delivery
  • Compiled HTML File
  • Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
  • Double File Extension
  • File and Directory Permissions Modification
  • File System Logical Offsets
  • Hidden Files and Directories
  • Install Root Certificate
  • Archive Collected Data
  • Archive via Custom Method
  • Archive via Utility
  • Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification
  • MMC
  • NTFS File Attributes
  • PubPrn
  • Resource Forking
  • Rundll32
  • Scripting
  • Space after Filename
  • System Script Proxy Execution
  • XSL Script Processing
  • Intelligence Indicator - Hash
  • Known Hash
  • Malicious File
  • File and Directory Discovery
  • AppleScript
  • Command and Scripting Interpreter
  • JavaScript
  • JavaScript/JScript
  • Malicious Image
  • PowerShell
  • Python
  • Service Execution
  • Unix Shell
  • User Execution
  • Data Destruction
  • Spearphishing Attachment
  • .bash_profile and .bashrc
  • Change Default File Association
  • Ccache Files
  • Chat Messages
  • Multi-Factor Authentication
  • TCC Manipulation
  • Application Versioning
  • Fileless Storage
  • Embedded Payloads
  • File/Path Exclusions
  • Encrypted/Encoded File
  • Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
  • Masquerade File Type
  • Stripped Payloads
  • Clear Network Connection History and Configurations
  • Disable or Modify Linux Audit System
  • Junk Code Insertion
  • Extended Attributes
  • SVG Smuggling
  • Indicator Removal
  • LNK Icon Smuggling
  • Polymorphic Code
  • Relocate Malware
  • Clear Persistence
  • Compression
  • Compromise Host Software Binary
  • Conceal Multimedia Files
  • Browser Information Discovery
  • Taint Shared Content
  • Shared Webroot
then, md5 log field is mapped to the target.file.md5 UDM field.
Else, md5 log field is mapped to the target.process.file.md5 UDM field.
target.process.file.sha1 sha1 If the technique_name log field value contain one of the following values
  • Archive via Library
  • Ingress Tool Transfer
  • Remote File Copy
  • File Transfer Protocols
  • Credentials from Web Browsers
  • Credentials In Files
  • Proc Filesystem
  • Unsecured Credentials
  • File Deletion
  • Obfuscated Files or Information
  • Compile After Delivery
  • Compiled HTML File
  • Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
  • Double File Extension
  • File and Directory Permissions Modification
  • File System Logical Offsets
  • Hidden Files and Directories
  • Install Root Certificate
  • Archive Collected Data
  • Archive via Custom Method
  • Archive via Utility
  • Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification
  • MMC
  • NTFS File Attributes
  • PubPrn
  • Resource Forking
  • Rundll32
  • Scripting
  • Space after Filename
  • System Script Proxy Execution
  • XSL Script Processing
  • Intelligence Indicator - Hash
  • Known Hash
  • Malicious File
  • File and Directory Discovery
  • AppleScript
  • Command and Scripting Interpreter
  • JavaScript
  • JavaScript/JScript
  • Malicious Image
  • PowerShell
  • Python
  • Service Execution
  • Unix Shell
  • User Execution
  • Data Destruction
  • Spearphishing Attachment
  • .bash_profile and .bashrc
  • Change Default File Association
  • Ccache Files
  • Chat Messages
  • Multi-Factor Authentication
  • TCC Manipulation
  • Application Versioning
  • Fileless Storage
  • Embedded Payloads
  • File/Path Exclusions
  • Encrypted/Encoded File
  • Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
  • Masquerade File Type
  • Stripped Payloads
  • Clear Network Connection History and Configurations
  • Disable or Modify Linux Audit System
  • Junk Code Insertion
  • Extended Attributes
  • SVG Smuggling
  • Indicator Removal
  • LNK Icon Smuggling
  • Polymorphic Code
  • Relocate Malware
  • Clear Persistence
  • Compression
  • Compromise Host Software Binary
  • Conceal Multimedia Files
  • Browser Information Discovery
  • Taint Shared Content
  • Shared Webroot
then, sha1 log field is mapped to the target.file.sha1 UDM field.
Else, sha1 log field is mapped to the target.process.file.sha1 UDM field.
target.file.sha256 sha256 If the technique_name log field value contain one of the following values
  • Archive via Library
  • Ingress Tool Transfer
  • Remote File Copy
  • File Transfer Protocols
  • Credentials from Web Browsers
  • Credentials In Files
  • Proc Filesystem
  • Unsecured Credentials
  • File Deletion
  • Obfuscated Files or Information
  • Compile After Delivery
  • Compiled HTML File
  • Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
  • Double File Extension
  • File and Directory Permissions Modification
  • File System Logical Offsets
  • Hidden Files and Directories
  • Install Root Certificate
  • Archive Collected Data
  • Archive via Custom Method
  • Archive via Utility
  • Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification
  • MMC
  • NTFS File Attributes
  • PubPrn
  • Resource Forking
  • Rundll32
  • Scripting
  • Space after Filename
  • System Script Proxy Execution
  • XSL Script Processing
  • Intelligence Indicator - Hash
  • Known Hash
  • Malicious File
  • File and Directory Discovery
  • AppleScript
  • Command and Scripting Interpreter
  • JavaScript
  • JavaScript/JScript
  • Malicious Image
  • PowerShell
  • Python
  • Service Execution
  • Unix Shell
  • User Execution
  • Data Destruction
  • Spearphishing Attachment
  • .bash_profile and .bashrc
  • Change Default File Association
  • Ccache Files
  • Chat Messages
  • Multi-Factor Authentication
  • TCC Manipulation
  • Application Versioning
  • Fileless Storage
  • Embedded Payloads
  • File/Path Exclusions
  • Encrypted/Encoded File
  • Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
  • Masquerade File Type
  • Stripped Payloads
  • Clear Network Connection History and Configurations
  • Disable or Modify Linux Audit System
  • Junk Code Insertion
  • Extended Attributes
  • SVG Smuggling
  • Indicator Removal
  • LNK Icon Smuggling
  • Polymorphic Code
  • Relocate Malware
  • Clear Persistence
  • Compression
  • Compromise Host Software Binary
  • Conceal Multimedia Files
  • Browser Information Discovery
  • Taint Shared Content
  • Shared Webroot
then, sha256 log field is mapped to the target.file.sha256 UDM field.
Else, sha256 log field is mapped to the target.process.file.sha256 UDM field.
If the product log field value is equal to epp and the type log field value is equal to ofp and if the ioc_type log field value is equal to hash_sha256 and the macros.ioc_value log field value is not empty then, macros.ioc_value log field is mapped to the target.file.sha256 UDM field and the security_result.detection_fields.key UDM field is set to sha256 and sha256 log field is mapped to the security_result.detection_fields.value UDM field.
target.asset.platform_software.platform operating_system If the operating_system log field value matches the regular expression pattern (?i)Windows then, the principal.asset.platform_software.platform UDM field is set to WINDOWS.
Else, if operating_system log field value matches the regular expression pattern (?i)linux then, the principal.asset.platform_software.platform UDM field is set to LINUX.
Else, if operating_system log field value matches the regular expression pattern (?i)ios then, the principal.asset.platform_software.platform UDM field is set to IOS.
Else, if operating_system log field value matches the regular expression pattern (?i)mac then, the principal.asset.platform_software.platform UDM field is set to MAC.
security_result.detection_fields[agent_version] agent_version principal.asset.attribute.labels[agent_version]
about.email enrollment_email principal.user.email_addresses
principal.asset.type If the mdm_device_id log field value is not empty or the mobile_hardware log field value is not empty or the mobile_manufacturer log field value is not empty or the mobile_serial log field value is not empty then, the principal.asset.type UDM field is set to MOBILE.
security_result.detection_fields[detection_context_user_is_admin] detection_context.user_is_admin security_result.about.user.attribute.label[detection_context_user_is_admin]
security_result.detection_fields[detection_context_user_sid] detection_context.user_sid security_result.about.user.attribute.label[detection_context_user_sid]
principal.asset.attribute.labels[pod_id] device.pod_id principal.resource.product_object_id
principal.asset.attribute.labels[pod_labels] device.pod_labels principal.resource.attribute.labels[pod_labels]
principal.asset.attribute.labels[pod_name] device.pod_name principal.resource.name
principal.asset.attribute.labels[pod_namespace] device.pod_namespace principal.resource.attribute.labels[pod_namespace]
principal.asset.attribute.labels[pod_service_account_name] device.pod_service_account_name principal.resource.attribute.labels[pod_service_account_name]

支援的 CrowdStrike 記錄格式

CrowdStrike 剖析器支援 JSON 格式的記錄。

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