# Cloud Service Mesh security overview

Cloud Service Mesh security helps you *mitigate insider threats* and *reduce the
risk of a data breach* by ensuring that all communications between workloads
are encrypted, mutually authenticated, and authorized.

Traditionally, micro-segmentation that uses IP-based rules has been used to
mitigate insider risks. However, the adoption of containers, shared services,
and distributed production environments spread across multiple clouds makes this
approach harder to configure and even harder to maintain.

With Cloud Service Mesh, you can configure a layer of *service context-aware*
and *request context-aware* network security that is independent of the security
of the underlying network. Because of this, Cloud Service Mesh lets you adopt a
defense-in-depth posture that is consistent with *Zero Trust* security
principles. It lets you achieve this posture through declarative policies
and without modifying any application code.

## mutual TLS

Cloud Service Mesh uses mutual TLS (mTLS) for peer authentication. Authentication
refers to identity: who is this service? who is this end-user? and can I trust
that they are who they say they are?

mTLS makes it possible for workloads to verify each other's identities and
authenticate with each other. You might be familiar with simple TLS through its
use in HTTPS to allow browsers to trust web servers and to encrypt the data that
is exchanged. When simple TLS is used, the client establishes that the server
can be trusted by validating its certificate. mTLS is an implementation of TLS
in which both client and server present certificates to each other and verify
each other's identities.

mTLS is the means by which Cloud Service Mesh implements both *authentication* and
*encryption* between services.

In Cloud Service Mesh 1.6 and later, auto mTLS is enabled by default. With auto
mTLS, a client sidecar proxy automatically detects if the server has a sidecar.
The client sidecar sends mTLS to workloads with sidecars and sends plain text to
workloads without sidecars. Note, however, services *accept* both plain-text and
mTLS traffic. To secure your service mesh, we recommend that you migrate your
services to only accept mTLS traffic.

For more information on enforcing only mTLS, see
[Cloud Service Mesh by example: mTLS](https://docs.cloud.google.com/service-mesh/v1.20/docs/by-example/mtls.md.txt).

### Cipher suite configuration

The following list includes Cloud Service Mesh's default, FIPS-compliant cipher
suites:

```text
ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256
ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256
ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384
ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384
```

For improved security, the server-side minimum TLS version supported by
Cloud Service Mesh workloads is 1.2, which supports customizing cipher suites.
Note that Cloud Service Mesh also supports TLS v1.3, which hard-codes cipher suites
and
[does not support changing them](https://docs.cloud.google.com/load-balancing/docs/ssl-policies-concepts.md.txt#caveats).

For more information on cipher suites, see
[Envoy's common TLS configuration](https://www.envoyproxy.io/docs/envoy/latest/api-v3/extensions/transport_sockets/tls/v3/common.proto) and
[Istio's Mutual TLS authentication](https://istio.io/latest/docs/concepts/security/#mutual-tls-authentication).

## Security benefits

Cloud Service Mesh provides the following security benefits:

- **Mitigates risk of replay or impersonation attacks that use stolen
  credentials.** Cloud Service Mesh relies on mTLS certificates to authenticate
  peers, rather than bearer tokens such as
  [JSON Web Tokens](https://jwt.io/introduction/) (JWT).
  Because mTLS certificates are bound to the TLS channel, it is not possible for
  an entity within your production environment to impersonate another by simply
  replaying the authentication token without access to the private keys.

- **Ensures encryption in transit.** Using mTLS for authentication also ensures
  that all TCP communications are encrypted in transit.

- **Ensures that only authorized clients can access a service with sensitive
  data.** Only authorized clients can access a service with sensitive data
  irrespective of the network location of the client and the application-level
  credentials. You can specify that only clients with authorized service
  identities or in authorized Kubernetes namespaces can access a service. You can
  also use IP-based access policies to grant access to clients deployed outside
  the GKE Enterprise environment.

- **Mitigates the risk of user data breach within your production network.** You
  can ensure that insiders can only access sensitive data through authorized
  clients. Furthermore, you can ensure that certain clients can only gain access
  to user data if the client can present a valid and short-lived user token. This
  mitigates the risk that the compromise of a single client credential grants an
  attacker access to all user data.

- **Identifies which clients accessed a service with sensitive data.**
  Cloud Service Mesh access logging captures the mTLS identity of the client in
  addition to the IP address. Thus, you can easily understand which workload
  accessed a service even if the workload is ephemeral and dynamically deployed,
  and in a different cluster or Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) network.

## Features

This section describes the features that Cloud Service Mesh provides to realize
its security benefits.

### Automatic certificate and key rotation

Using mTLS based on service identities makes it possible to encrypt all TCP
communications and provides a more secure non-replayable credential for access
control. One of the key challenges of using mTLS at scale is managing the keys
and certificates for all target workloads. Cloud Service Mesh takes care of rotating
mTLS keys and certificates for GKE Enterprise workloads without disrupting
communications. Configuration of smaller cert refresh intervals is possible to
reduce risk.

### Cloud Service Mesh certificate authority

Cloud Service Mesh includes a managed multi-regional private certificate
authority, *Cloud Service Mesh certificate authority*, for issuing certificates for mTLS.
Cloud Service Mesh certificate authority is a highly reliable and scalable service that is
optimized for dynamically scaled workloads on a cloud platform. With
Cloud Service Mesh certificate authority, Google manages the security and availability of the
CA backend. Cloud Service Mesh certificate authority lets you rely on a single root of trust
across GKE Enterprise clusters. When using Cloud Service Mesh certificate authority, you can
rely on workload identity pools to provide coarse-grained isolation. By
default, authentication fails if the client and the server are not in the same workload identity pool.

Certificates from Cloud Service Mesh certificate authority include the following data about
your application's services:

- The Google Cloud project ID
- The GKE namespace
- The GKE service account name

> [!IMPORTANT]
> **Important:** The certificates issued by Cloud Service Mesh certificate authority should only be used to enable secure service-to-service communication within your service mesh, and not be used for any other purpose. These certificates are sent whenever services attempt to communicate with each other using mutual TLS. Make sure that you don't inadvertently expose confidential information by using these certificates when communicating outside your service mesh.

### Certificate Authority Service

As an alternative to Cloud Service Mesh certificate authority, you can configure
Cloud Service Mesh to use Certificate Authority Service, which is suitable for the
following use cases:

- If you need different certificate authorities to sign workload certificates on different clusters.
- If you want to use Istiod Custom CA plugin certificates.
- If you need to back your signing keys in a managed HSM.
- If you are in a highly regulated industry and are subject to compliance.
- If you want to chain up your Cloud Service Mesh CA to a custom enterprise root certificate to sign workload certificates.

The cost of Cloud Service Mesh certificate authority is included in the Cloud Service Mesh
pricing. The CA Service isn't included in the base
Cloud Service Mesh price and is charged separately. Additionally,
CA Service comes with an explicit SLA, but
Cloud Service Mesh certificate authority does not.

For this integration, all workloads in Cloud Service Mesh are granted two
IAM roles:

- [privateca.workloadCertificateRequester](https://docs.cloud.google.com/certificate-authority-service/docs/reference/permissions-and-roles)
- [privateca.auditor](https://docs.cloud.google.com/certificate-authority-service/docs/reference/permissions-and-roles)

### Identity-aware access control (firewall) policies

With Cloud Service Mesh, you can configure network security policies that are
based on the mTLS identity versus the IP address of the peer. This lets you
create policies that are independent of the network location of the workload.
Only communications across clusters in the same Google Cloud project are currently
supported.

### Request claims-aware access control (firewall) policies

In addition to the mTLS identity, you can grant access based on request claims
in the JWT header of HTTP or gRPC requests. Cloud Service Mesh lets you assert
that a JWT is signed by a trusted entity. This means that you can configure
policies that allow access from certain clients only if a request claim exists
or matches a specified value.

### User authentication with Identity-Aware Proxy

You authenticate users that are accessing any service exposed on an
Cloud Service Mesh ingress gateway by using
[Identity-Aware Proxy (IAP)](https://docs.cloud.google.com/iap). IAP can authenticate users
that are logging in from a browser, integrate with custom identity providers,
and issue a short-lived JWT token or an RCToken that can then be used to grant
access at the Ingress gateway or a downstream service (by using a side-car).
For more information, see
[Integrating IAP with Cloud Service Mesh](https://docs.cloud.google.com/service-mesh/v1.20/docs/unified-install/options/iap-integration.md.txt).

### User authentication with your existing Identity Provider

You can integrate your existing Identity Provider with Cloud Service Mesh to provide
browser-based end-user authentication and access control to your deployed
workloads. For more information, see
[Configuring Cloud Service Mesh user authentication](https://docs.cloud.google.com/service-mesh/v1.20/docs/unified-install/options/end-user-auth.md.txt).

### Access logging and monitoring

Cloud Service Mesh ensures that access logs and metrics are available in
[Google Cloud Observability](https://docs.cloud.google.com/stackdriver/docs.md.txt), and provides an integrated dashboard
to understand access patterns for a service or workload based on this data. You
can also choose to configure a private destination. Cloud Service Mesh lets
you reduce noise in access logs by only logging successful accesses once in a
configurable time window. Requests that are denied by a security policy or
result in an error are always logged. This lets you significantly reduce the
costs associated with ingesting, storing, and processing logs, without the loss
of key security signals.

### FIPS compliant

All in-cluster control plane components and proxies on x86 architecture use
[FIPS 140-2 validated](https://cloud.google.com/security/compliance/fips-140-2-validated) encryption
modules.

## Limitations

Cloud Service Mesh security currently has the following limitation:

- User authentication that uses IAP requires that a service be published to the internet. IAP and Cloud Service Mesh let you configure policies that can restrict access to authorized users and clients in an allowed IP range. If you choose to only expose the service to clients within the same network, you need to configure a custom policy engine for user authentication and token issuance.

## What's next

- [Cloud Service Mesh security best practices](https://docs.cloud.google.com/service-mesh/v1.20/docs/security/anthos-service-mesh-security-best-practices.md.txt)
- [Configure transport security](https://docs.cloud.google.com/service-mesh/v1.20/docs/security/configuring-mtls.md.txt)
- [Update your authorization policies](https://docs.cloud.google.com/service-mesh/v1.20/docs/security/authorization-policy-overview.md.txt)