> [!NOTE]
> Premium and Enterprise (Deprecated) [service tiers](https://docs.cloud.google.com/security-command-center/docs/service-tiers.md.txt)

> [!CAUTION]
> The Security Command Center Enterprise service tier will shut down on May 21, 2027. If your organization uses the Enterprise service tier, then the organization will automatically move to the Premium service tier on or after May 21, 2027. Contact your account representative or a [Google Cloud sales specialist](https://cloud.google.com/contact) if you have questions.

This document describes a threat finding type in Security Command Center. Threat findings are generated by
[threat detectors](https://docs.cloud.google.com/security-command-center/docs/concepts-security-sources.md.txt#threats) when they detect
a potential threat in your cloud resources. For a full list of available threat findings, see [Threat findings index](https://docs.cloud.google.com/security-command-center/docs/threat-findings-index.md.txt).

## Overview

> [!WARNING]
>
> **Preview**
>
>
> This feature is
>
> subject to the "Pre-GA Offerings Terms" in the General Service Terms section of the
> [Service Specific
> Terms](https://docs.cloud.google.com/terms/service-terms#1).
>
> Pre-GA features are available "as is" and might have limited support.
>
> For more information, see the
> [launch stage descriptions](https://cloud.google.com/products/#product-launch-stages).

Someone manually approved a certificate signing request (CSR). Creating a
certificate for cluster authentication is a common method for attackers to
create persistent access to a compromised cluster. The permissions associated
with the certificate vary depending on which subject they included, but can be
highly privileged. For more details, see the log message for this alert.

[Event Threat Detection](https://docs.cloud.google.com/security-command-center/docs/concepts-event-threat-detection-overview.md.txt) is the source of
this finding.

## How to respond


The following response plan might be appropriate for this finding, but might also impact operations.
Carefully evaluate the information you gather in your investigation to determine the best way to
resolve findings.

To respond to this finding, do the following:

1. Review the audit logs in Cloud Logging and additional alerts for other CSR related events to determine if CSR related actions are expected activity by the principal.
2. Determine whether there are other signs of malicious activity by the principal in the audit logs in Cloud Logging. For example:
   - Was the principal who approved the CSR different from the one who created it?
   - Did the CSR specify a built-in signer, but ultimately need to be manually approved because it did not meet the signer's criteria?
   - Has the principal tried requesting, creating, approving, or deleting other CSRs?
3. If a CSR approval was not expected, or is determined to be malicious, the cluster will require a credential rotation to invalidate the certificate. Review the guidance for [performing a rotation of your cluster credentials](https://docs.cloud.google.com/kubernetes-engine/docs/how-to/credential-rotation.md.txt).

## What's next

- Learn [how to work with threat
  findings in Security Command Center](https://docs.cloud.google.com/security-command-center/docs/how-to-investigate-threats).
- Refer to the [Threat findings index](https://docs.cloud.google.com/security-command-center/docs/threat-findings-index.md.txt).
- Learn how to [review a
  finding](https://docs.cloud.google.com/security-command-center/docs/how-to-investigate-threats#reviewing_findings) through the Google Cloud console.
- Learn about the [services that
  generate threat findings](https://docs.cloud.google.com/security-command-center/docs/concepts-security-sources#threats).