## Top-level claims

The following table describes the top-level claims in the attestation token.
These items are compliant with the
[OpenID Connect 1.0 specification](https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html).

[Read more about attestation tokens](https://docs.cloud.google.com/confidential-computing/confidential-space/docs/connect-external-resources)

| Key | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Header |||
| [x5c](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7515#section-4.1.6) | String | Only present in PKI tokens. The certificate chain to validate PKI tokens against. You can download the root certificate from the [PKI token validation endpoint](https://confidentialcomputing.googleapis.com/.well-known/attestation-pki-root). |
| JSON data payload |||
| `attester_tcb` | Array of strings | One or more TCB (trusted computing base) components. This claim is to specify the source of attestation evidence. For the `hwmodel claim "GCP_INTEL_TDX"` on Confidential Space, the value is set to `["INTEL"]`, indicating that the attestation root of trust originates from Intel-specific hardware technology. |
| `aud` | String | The audience. For the default token used with a workload identity pool, the audience is `https://sts.googleapis.com`. This token is fetched every hour by the launcher in the Confidential VM instance. For tokens with custom audiences, the audience is echoed from the audience in the token request. The maximum length is 512 bytes. |
| `dbgstat` | String | The debug status for the Confidential Space image. In production images, the value is `disabled-since-boot`. In debug images, the value is `enabled`. |
| `eat_nonce` | String, or array of strings | One or more nonces for the attestation token. The values are echoed from the token options sent in the custom token request. Each nonce must be between 8 and 88 bytes inclusive. A maximum of six nonces are allowed. |
| `exp` | Int, Unix timestamp | The expiration time on or after which the token must not be accepted for processing. The value is a JSON number that represents the number of seconds from `1970-01-01T0:0:0Z` as measured in UTC until the expiry time. |
| `google_service_accounts` | Array of strings | The validated service accounts that are running the Confidential Space workload. |
| `hwmodel` | Enumeration | The unique identifier for the hardware token. Must be one of the following values: - `GCP_AMD_SEV` - `GCP_AMD_SEV_ES` - `GCP_SHIELDED_VM` - `GCP_INTEL_TDX` |
| `https://aws.amazon.com/tags` | Object | See [AWS principal tag claims](https://docs.cloud.google.com/confidential-computing/confidential-space/docs/reference/token-claims#aws-principal-tag-claims). |
| `iat` | Int, Unix timestamp | The time when the JWT was issued. The value is a JSON number that represents the number of seconds from `1970-01-01T0:0:0Z` as measured in UTC until the issue time. |
| `iss` | String | The issuer of the token. The URIs for the valid issuers are as follows: - Google Cloud Attestation: `https://confidentialcomputing.googleapis.com` - Intel Trust Authority: `https://portal.trustauthority.intel.com` |
| `nbf` | Int, Unix timestamp | The time after which the JWT is allowed to be processed. The value is a JSON number that represents the number of seconds from `1970-01-01T0:0:0Z` as measured in UTC. |
| `oemid` | Uint64 | The value changes depending on the attestation service. For Google Cloud Attestation, it's Google's [Private Enterprise Number (PEN)](https://pen.iana.org/pen/PenApplication.page), `11129`. |
| `secboot` | Boolean | Whether Secure Boot is enabled, which makes sure that the firmware and operating system are authenticated during the VM boot process. This value is always `true`. |
| `sub` | String | The subject, which is the fully qualified virtual machine ID for the Confidential VM. For example, `https://www.googleapis.com/compute/v1/projects/PROJECT_ID/zones/ZONE/instances/INSTANCE_ID`. This format is known as the [instance's selfLink](https://docs.cloud.google.com/compute/docs/reference/rest/v1/instances). |
| `submods` | Object | An object containing various claims. See [Submods claims](https://docs.cloud.google.com/confidential-computing/confidential-space/docs/reference/token-claims#submods-claims). |
| `tdx` | Array of objects | An array of various claims. See [Intel TDX claims](https://docs.cloud.google.com/confidential-computing/confidential-space/docs/reference/token-claims#tdx-claims). |
| `swname` | String | The name of the approved operating system for the VM. Values are `CONFIDENTIAL_SPACE` or `GCE`. The `CONFIDENTIAL_SPACE` value is for hardened and debug Confidential Space images that passed all validation. |
| `swversion` | Array of strings | The version of the operating system. The value is an array of strings that contains only one value. The version follows the format `YYYYMM##`, where `##` is a counter for the number of images released before the image being used in the same month. |

### AWS principal tag claims

The following table describes the `AWS_PrincipalTag` claims in the
attestation token. These claims are placed in the `https://aws.amazon.com/tags`
claims, in the `principal_tags` object in the attestation token.
To learn about the `https://aws.amazon.com/tags` claim structure,
see [AWS principal tag claims](https://docs.cloud.google.com/confidential-computing/confidential-space/docs/connect-external-resources#aws-compatible-claims).

| Key | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| `confidential_space.support_attributes` | Array of strings | Derivative claim of support attributes. This is a concatenated string representation of the original claims. For example, if the original claims are `Latest`, `Stable`, and `Usable`, this attribute contains `LATEST=STABLE=USABLE`. If the original claim is only `Usable`, this attribute contains `USABLE`. |
| `container.image_digest` | Array of strings | See [Workload container claims](https://docs.cloud.google.com/confidential-computing/confidential-space/docs/reference/token-claims#workload-container-claims). Container image signatures and digests don't appear together in a single token. If you're using `container.image_digest` in your AWS policies, you must remove any references to `container.signatures.key_ids`. |
| `container.signatures.key_id` | Array of strings | A concatenated list of container image signature key IDs. This field represents multiple signature key IDs joined into a single string in the array. For example, if you have key IDs `aKey1`, `zKey2`, and `bKey3`, this claim contains the value `aKey1=bKey3=zKey2`. Container image signatures and digests don't appear together in a single token. If you are using `container.signatures.key_ids` in your AWS policies, you must remove any references to `container.image_digest`. For more information about container image signature claims, see [AWS policies with container image signature claims](https://docs.cloud.google.com/confidential-computing/confidential-space/docs/connect-external-resources#aws-policies). |
| `gce.project_id` | Array of strings | See [Compute Engine claims](https://docs.cloud.google.com/confidential-computing/confidential-space/docs/reference/token-claims#compute-engine-claims). |
| `gce.zone` | Array of strings | See [Compute Engine claims](https://docs.cloud.google.com/confidential-computing/confidential-space/docs/reference/token-claims#compute-engine-claims). |

### Intel TDX claims

The following table describes the `tdx` claims in the attestation token.

| Key | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| `gcp_attester_tcb_status` | String | A string value that represents the TCB level status of the Google Cloud platform being evaluated. For more information about `tcbStatus`, see Intel's [Provisioning Certification Service API documentation](https://api.portal.trustedservices.intel.com/content/documentation.html). This claim indicates that the TDX TCB version was up to date with Intel's reference values when Google began its firmware rollout. However, it doesn't guarantee that the Google fleet remains up to date with Intel's real-time TCB reference values. |
| `gcp_attester_tcb_date` | String | The TCB date for the attesting Google Cloud platform. The time value is UTC in ISO 8601 format `(YYYY-MM-DDThh:mm:ssZ)`. |
| `tcb_evaluation_data_number` | Uint32 | A sequence number representing the version of the TCB evaluation data. Intel increments this number each time the data is updated. For more information about `tcbEvaluationDataNumber`, see Intel's [Provisioning Certification Service API documentation](https://api.portal.trustedservices.intel.com/content/documentation.html). |

## Submods claims

The following table describes the `submods` claims in the attestation token.

| Key | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| `confidential_space.support_attributes` | Array of strings | The array can contain the values `EXPERIMENTAL`, `USABLE`, `STABLE`, and `LATEST`. For more information, see [Confidential Space image lifecycle](https://docs.cloud.google.com/confidential-computing/confidential-space/docs/confidential-space-images#image-lifecycle). |
| `confidential_space.monitoring_enabled` | Object | Shows what kind of system monitoring is enabled. The value can be `{"memory":false}` or `{"memory":true}`. |
| `container` | Object | See [Workload container claims](https://docs.cloud.google.com/confidential-computing/confidential-space/docs/reference/token-claims#workload-container-claims). |
| `gce` | Object | See [Compute Engine claims](https://docs.cloud.google.com/confidential-computing/confidential-space/docs/reference/token-claims#compute-engine-claims). |
| `nvidia_gpu` | Object | See [NVIDIA GPU claims](https://docs.cloud.google.com/confidential-computing/confidential-space/docs/reference/token-claims#nvidia-gpu-claims). |

### Compute Engine claims

The following table describes the `gce` claims in the attestation token.

| Key | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| `instance_id` | String | The VM instance ID. |
| `instance_name` | String | The VM instance name. |
| `project_id` | String | The [project ID](https://docs.cloud.google.com/resource-manager/docs/cloud-platform-resource-hierarchy#projects) for the project that the VM is running in. |
| `project_number` | String | The project number for the project that the VM is running in. |
| `zone` | String | The Compute Engine zone where the Confidential VM instance is running. |

### NVIDIA GPU claims

The following table describes the `nvidia_gpu` claims in the attestation token.

| Key | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| `cc_feature` | Enumeration | The Confidential Computing supported by an NVIDIA GPU. Only single GPU passthrough (SPT) mode is supported in Confidential Space, so the value is always `SPT`. For more information about NVIDIA Confidential Computing support, see [NVIDIA Trusted Computing Solutions (PDF)](https://docs.nvidia.com/580trd1-trusted-computing-solutions-release-notes.pdf). |
| `cc_mode` | Enumeration | The Confidential Computing status of the NVIDIA GPU. This claim attests to the GPU driver only, not the entire GPU device. The value can be one of the following: - `OFF`: none of the NVIDIA Confidential Computing features are active. - `ON`: the NVIDIA H100 hardware, firmware, and software have fully activated the confidential computing features. - `DEVTOOLS`: the GPU is in a partial confidential computing mode that matches the workflows of `ON` mode, but disables security protections. |
| `gpus` | Array of objects | See [GPU hardware and software claims](https://docs.cloud.google.com/confidential-computing/confidential-space/docs/reference/token-claims#gpu-hardware-software). |

#### GPU hardware and software claims

| Key | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| `driver_version` | String | The NVIDIA driver version running on the Confidential VM. For example, `590.48.01`. |
| `hwmodel` | Enumeration | The `NV_GPU` architecture. Only NVIDIA's H100 is supported, so the value is always `GCP_NVIDIA_H100`. |
| `l4_serial_number` | Hex string | The serial number of the fourth-level NVIDIA GPU attestation certificate chain. |
| `ueid` | Hex string | The universal entity identifier according to [RFC 9711](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9711/). This is a unique device identifier for an attested NVIDIA GPU device. |
| `vbios_version` | String | The attested NVIDIA GPU VBIOS version. For example, `96.00.CF.00.01`. |

### Workload container claims

The following table describes the `container` claims in the attestation token.
For more information about these claims, see
[Attestation assertions](https://docs.cloud.google.com/confidential-computing/confidential-space/docs/create-grant-access-confidential-resources#attestation_assertions).

| Key | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| `args` | Array of strings | The full `argv` the container is invoked with. This claim includes the container's entrypoint path and any additional command-line arguments. |
| `cmd_override` | Array of strings | The [CMD](https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/builder/#cmd) commands and parameters used in the workload image. |
| `env` | Object | The environment variables and their values that have been explicitly passed to the container. |
| `env_override` | Object | The overwritten environment variables in the container. |
| `image_digest` | String | The image digest of the workload container. |
| `image_id` | String | The image ID of the workload container. |
| `image_reference` | String | The location of the workload container running in Confidential Space. |
| `image_signatures` | Array of objects | See [Container image signature claims](https://docs.cloud.google.com/confidential-computing/confidential-space/docs/reference/token-claims#container-image-signature-claims). |
| `restart_policy` | Enumeration | The restart policy of the container launcher when the workload stops. Valid values are `Always`, `OnFailure`, and `Never`. Default is `Never`. |

#### Container image signature claims

The following table describes the `image_signatures` claims in the attestation
token.

| Key | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| `key_id` | String | The hexadecimal fingerprint of the public key. To get the fingerprint, you can run the following command: ``` openssl pkey -pubin -in public_key.pem -outform DER | openssl sha256 ``` Where `public_key.pem` is your public key in PEM format. |
| `signature` | String | The base64-encoded signature for a payload that's associated with the signed container and that follows the [Simple Signing format](https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/blob/main/specs/SIGNATURE_SPEC.md#simple-signing). |
| `signature_algorithm` | Enumeration | The algorithm used to sign the key. One of the following: - `RSASSA_PSS_SHA256` (RSASSA-PSS with a SHA-256 digest) - `RSASSA_PKCS1V15_SHA256` (RSASSA-PKCS1 v1_5 with a SHA-256 digest) - `ECDSA_P256_SHA256` (ECDSA on the P-256 Curve with a SHA-256 digest) |

## What's next

- See the IETF draft for
  [The Entity Attestation Token (EAT)](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-rats-eat-22)
  for more information on attestation claims.

- See the
  [OpenID Connect Core 1.0](https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html)
  for more information on OpenID token claims.