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- [Latest](https://docs.cloud.google.com/anthos/clusters/docs/bare-metal/latest/how-to/hardening-your-cluster)
- [Version 1.16](https://docs.cloud.google.com/anthos/clusters/docs/bare-metal/1.16/how-to/hardening-your-cluster.md.txt)
- [Earlier versions (unsupported)](https://docs.cloud.google.com/anthos/clusters/docs/bare-metal/1.16/getting-support.md.txt#version-support)

<br />

This document describes how to harden the security of your Distributed Cloud
clusters.

## Secure your containers using SELinux

You can secure your containers by enabling SELinux, which is supported for Red
Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL). If your host machines are running RHEL and you want
to enable SELinux for your cluster, you must enable SELinux in all of your host
machines. See [secure your containers using
SELinux](https://docs.cloud.google.com/anthos/clusters/docs/bare-metal/1.16/installing/configure-selinux) for details.

## Use `seccomp` to restrict containers

> [!WARNING]
>
> **Preview**
>
>
> This product or feature is
>
> subject to the "Pre-GA Offerings Terms" in the General Service Terms section
> of the [Service Specific
> Terms](https://docs.cloud.google.com/terms/service-terms#1).
>
> Pre-GA products and features are available "as is" and might have limited support.
>
> For more information, see the
> [launch stage descriptions](https://cloud.google.com/products/#product-launch-stages).

Secure computing mode (`seccomp`) is available in version 1.11 of
Distributed Cloud and higher. Running containers with a `seccomp` profile
improves the security of your cluster because it restricts the system calls that
containers are allowed to make to the kernel. This reduces the chance of kernel
vulnerabilities being exploited.

The default `seccomp` profile contains a list of system calls that a container
is allowed to make. Any system calls not on the list are disallowed. `seccomp`
is enabled by default in version 1.11 of Distributed Cloud. This means that all
system containers and customer workloads are run with the container runtime's
default `seccomp` profile. Even containers and workloads that don't specify a
`seccomp` profile in their configuration files are subject to `seccomp`
restrictions.

### How to disable `seccomp` cluster-wide or on particular workloads

You can disable `seccomp` during cluster creation or cluster upgrade only.
`bmctl update` can't be used to disable this feature. If you want to disable
`seccomp` within a cluster, add the following `clusterSecurity` section to the
cluster's configuration file:

```yaml
apiVersion: baremetal.cluster.gke.io/v1
kind: Cluster
metadata:
  name: example
  namespace: cluster-example
spec:
...clusterSecurity:
enableSeccomp: false
...
```

In the unlikely event that some of your workloads need to execute system
calls that `seccomp` blocks by default, you don't have to disable `seccomp` on
the whole cluster. Instead, you can single out particular workloads to run in
`unconfined mode`. Running a workload in `unconfined mode` frees that workload
from the restrictions that the `seccomp` profile imposes on the rest of the
cluster.

To run a container in `unconfined mode`, add the following `securityContext`
section to the Pod manifest:

```yaml
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
....
spec:securityContext:
seccompProfile:
type: Unconfined
....
```

## Don't run containers as `root` user

By default, processes in containers execute as `root`. This poses a potential
security problem, because if a process breaks out of the container, that process
runs as `root` on the host machine. It's therefore advisable to run all your
workloads as a non-root user.

The following sections describe two ways of running containers as a non-root
user.

### Method #1: add `USER` instruction in `Dockerfile`

This method uses a `Dockerfile` to ensure that containers don't run as a `root`
user. In a `Dockerfile`, you can specify which user the process inside a container
should be run as. The following snippet from a `Dockerfile` shows how to do this:

```yaml
....

#Add a user with userid 8877 and name nonroot
RUN useradd −u 8877 nonroot

#Run Container as nonroot
USER nonroot
....
```

In this example, the Linux command `useradd -u` creates a user called `nonroot`
inside the container. This user has a user ID (UID) of `8877`.

The next line in the `Dockerfile` runs the command `USER nonroot`. This command
specifies that from this point on in the image, commands are run as the user
`nonroot`.

Grant permissions to UID `8877` so that the container processes can execute
properly for `nonroot`.

### Method #2: add securityContext fields in Kubernetes manifest file

This method uses a Kubernetes manifest file to ensure that containers don't run
as a `root` user. Security settings are specified for a Pod, and those security
settings are in turn applied to all containers within the Pod.

The following example shows an excerpt of a manifest file for a given Pod:

```yaml
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
  name: name-of-pod
spec:
  securityContext:
    runAsUser: 8877
    runAsGroup: 8877
....
```

The `runAsUser` field specifies that for any containers in the Pod, all
processes run with user ID `8877`. The `runAsGroup` field specifies that these
processes have a primary group ID (GID) of `8877`. Remember to grant the
necessary and sufficient permissions to UID `8877` so that the container
processes can execute properly.

This ensures that processes within a container are run as UID `8877`, which has
fewer privileges than root.

System containers in Google Distributed Cloud help install and manage clusters.
The UIDs and GIDs used by these containers can be controlled by the field
`startUIDRangeRootlessContainers` in the cluster specification. The
`startUIDRangeRootlessContainers` is an optional field which, if not specified,
has a value of `2000`. Allowed values for `startUIDRangeRootlessContainers` are
`1000`-`57000`. The `startUIDRangeRootlessContainers` value can be changed
during upgrades only. The system containers use the UIDs and GIDs in the range
`startUIDRangeRootlessContainers` to `startUIDRangeRootlessContainers` + 2999.

The following example shows an excerpt of a manifest file for a Cluster
resource:

```yaml
apiVersion: baremetal.cluster.gke.io/v1
kind: Cluster
metadata:
  name: name-of-cluster
spec:
 clusterSecurity:
    startUIDRangeRootlessContainers: 5000
...
```

Choose the value for `startUIDRangeRootlessContainers` so that the UID and GID
spaces used by the system containers don't overlap with those assigned to user
workloads.

### How to disable rootless mode

Starting with Google Distributed Cloud release 1.10, Kubernetes control plane
containers and system containers run as non-root users by default.
Google Distributed Cloud assigns these users UIDs and GIDs in the range
`2000`-`4999`. However, this assignment can cause problems if those UIDs and
GIDs have already been allocated to processes running inside your environment.

Starting with Google Distributed Cloud release 1.11, you can disable rootless
mode when you upgrade your cluster. When rootless mode is disabled, Kubernetes
control plane containers and system containers run as the root user.

To disable rootless mode, perform the following steps:

1. Add the following `clusterSecurity` section to the cluster's configuration
   file:

   ```yaml
   apiVersion: baremetal.cluster.gke.io/v1
   kind: Cluster
   metadata:
     name: example
     namespace: cluster-example
   spec:
   ...clusterSecurity:
   enableRootlessContainers: false
   ...
   ```
2. Upgrade your cluster. For details, see [Upgrade clusters](https://docs.cloud.google.com/anthos/clusters/docs/bare-metal/1.16/how-to/upgrade.md.txt).

## Restrict the ability for workloads to self-modify

Certain Kubernetes workloads, especially system workloads, have permission to
self-modify. For example, some workloads vertically autoscale themselves. While
convenient, this can allow an attacker who has already compromised a node to
escalate further in the cluster. For example, an attacker could have a workload
on the node change itself to run as a more privileged service account that
exists in the same namespace.

Ideally, workloads shouldn't be granted the permission to modify themselves in
the first place. When self-modification is necessary, you can limit permissions
by applying Gatekeeper or Policy Controller constraints, such as
[NoUpdateServiceAccount](https://github.com/open-policy-agent/gatekeeper-library/tree/master/library/general/noupdateserviceaccount)
from the open source Gatekeeper library, which provides several useful security
policies.

When you deploy policies, it's usually necessary to allow the controllers that
manage the cluster lifecycle to bypass the policies. This is necessary so that
the controllers can make changes to the cluster, such as applying cluster
upgrades. For example, if you deploy the `NoUpdateServiceAccount` policy on
Distributed Cloud, you must set the following parameters in the `Constraint`:

```yaml
parameters:
  allowedGroups:
  - system:masters
  allowedUsers: []
```

## Disable kubelet read-only port

Starting with release 1.15.0, Google Distributed Cloud disables by default port
`10255`, the kubelet read-only port. Any customer workloads that are configured to
read data from this insecure kubelet port `10255` should migrate to use the secure
kubelet port 10250.

Only clusters created with version 1.15.0 or higher have this port disabled by
default. The kubelet read-only port `10255` remains accessible for clusters
created with a version lower than 1.15.0, even after a cluster upgrade to
version 1.15.0 or higher.

This change was made because the kubelet leaks low sensitivity information over
port `10255`, which is unauthenticated. The information includes the full
configuration information for all Pods running on a Node, which can be valuable
to an attacker. It also exposes metrics and status information, which can
provide business-sensitive insights.

Disabling the kubelet read-only port is recommended by the CIS Kubernetes
Benchmark.

## Maintenance

Monitoring security bulletins and upgrading your clusters are important security
measures to take once your clusters are up and running.

### Monitor security bulletins

The GKE security team publishes
[security bulletins](https://docs.cloud.google.com/anthos/clusters/docs/security-bulletins)
for high and critical severity vulnerabilities.

These bulletins follow a common Google Cloud vulnerability numbering
scheme and are linked from the main Google Cloud bulletins page and the
Google Distributed Cloud release notes.


[Use this XML feed to subscribe to security bulletins for Google Distributed Cloud and related products.
![Subscribe](https://docs.cloud.google.com/static/docs/images/feed-icon.png)](https://cloud.google.com/feeds/anthos-gke-security-bulletins.xml)

When customer action is required to address these high and critical
vulnerabilities, Google contacts customers by email. In addition, Google might
also contact customers with support contracts through support channels.

For more information about how Google manages security vulnerabilities and
patches for GKE and GKE Enterprise, see
[Security patching](https://docs.cloud.google.com/kubernetes-engine/docs/resources/security-patching.md.txt).

### Upgrade clusters

Kubernetes regularly introduces new security features and provides security
patches. Google Distributed Cloud releases incorporate Kubernetes security
enhancements that address security vulnerabilities that may affect your clusters.

You are responsible for keeping your Google Distributed Cloud clusters up to
date. For each release, review the [release notes](https://docs.cloud.google.com/anthos/clusters/docs/bare-metal/1.16/release-notes.md.txt).
To minimize security risks to your clusters, plan to update to new patch
releases every month and minor versions every four months.

One of the many advantages of upgrading a cluster is that it automatically
refreshes the cluster kubeconfig file. The kubeconfig file authenticates a
user to a cluster. The kubeconfig file is added to your cluster directory when
you create a cluster with `bmctl`. The default name and path is
`bmctl-workspace/CLUSTER_NAME/CLUSTER_NAME-kubeconfig`.
When you upgrade a cluster, that cluster's kubeconfig file is automatically
renewed. Otherwise, the kubeconfig file expires one year after it was created.

> [!NOTE]
> **Note:** Only the kubeconfig file for the cluster you are upgrading gets renewed. If, for example, you upgrade an admin cluster that manages three user clusters, only the admin cluster's kubeconfig file is refreshed. You must upgrade each of the user clusters separately to refresh their respective kubeconfig files.

For information about how to upgrade your clusters, see
[upgrade your clusters](https://docs.cloud.google.com/anthos/clusters/docs/bare-metal/1.16/how-to/upgrade.md.txt).

## Use VPC Service Controls with Cloud Interconnect or Cloud VPN

Cloud Interconnect provides low latency, high availability connections that
let you transfer data reliably between your on-premises bare metal machines and
Google Cloud [Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) networks](https://docs.cloud.google.com/vpc/docs/vpc.md.txt). To learn more
about Cloud Interconnect, see [Dedicated Interconnect provisioning
overview](https://docs.cloud.google.com/network-connectivity/docs/interconnect/how-to/dedicated/provisioning-overview).

Cloud VPN securely connects your *peer network* to your
Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) network through an
[IPsec](https://wikipedia.org/wiki/IPsec)
[VPN](https://wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_private_network)
connection. To learn more about Cloud VPN, see
[Cloud VPN overview](https://docs.cloud.google.com/network-connectivity/docs/vpn/concepts/overview.md.txt).

VPC Service Controls works with either Cloud Interconnect or Cloud VPN
to provide additional security for your clusters. VPC Service Controls helps
to mitigate the risk of data exfiltration. Using VPC Service Controls, you can add
projects to service perimeters that protect resources and services from requests
that originate outside the perimeter. To learn more about service perimeters,
see [Service perimeter details and
configuration](https://docs.cloud.google.com/vpc-service-controls/docs/service-perimeters).

To fully protect Google Distributed Cloud, you need to use Restricted VIP and add
the following APIs to the service perimeter:

- Artifact Registry API (`artifactregistry.googleapis.com`)
- Resource Manager API (`cloudresourcemanager.googleapis.com`)
- Compute Engine API (`compute.googleapis.com`)
- Connect gateway API (`connectgateway.googleapis.com`)
- Google Container Registry API (`containerregistry.googleapis.com`)
- GKE Connect API (`gkeconnect.googleapis.com`)
- GKE Hub API (`gkehub.googleapis.com`)
- GKE On-Prem API (`gkeonprem.googleapis.com`)
- Identity and Access Management (IAM) API (`iam.googleapis.com`)
- Cloud Logging API (`logging.googleapis.com`)
- Cloud Monitoring API (`monitoring.googleapis.com`)
- Config Monitoring for Ops API (`opsconfigmonitoring.googleapis.com`)
- Service Control API (`servicecontrol.googleapis.com`)
- Cloud Storage API (`storage.googleapis.com`)

When you use `bmctl` to create or upgrade a cluster, use the `--skip-api-check`
flag to bypass calling Service Usage API (`serviceusage.googleapis.com`).
Service Usage API isn't supported by VPC Service Controls.

> [!NOTE]
> **Note:** You can't create or upgrade a cluster in the Google Cloud console when VPC Service Controls is enabled. The operation fails, because the `bmctl register bootstrap` command doesn't have the `--skip-api-check` flag. If you use VPC Service Controls, use `bmctl create cluster` to create clusters, or use `bmctl upgrade cluster` to upgrade clusters.